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LABOR LAW-UNIONS-UNION MUST
PETITION FOR AN ELECTION
The union possessed authorization cards1 from a majority of
the employees and demanded recognition as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative. The employer refused either to recognize the
union or to petition the National Labor Relations Board2 for an
election.3 The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the employer for refusing to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentative of the employees,4 but the Board refused to issue a bar-
gaining order.' The court of appeals reversed the Board's decision,
holding that it was inconsistent with the National Labor Relations
Act 6 for the Board not to find the employer guilty of an unfair labor
practice.7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
Held, reversed. The Supreme Court held in a five to four decision
that for practical administrative reasons, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the Board to refuse to issue a bargaining order when
an employer refused to recognize a union that possessed authoriza-
tion cards from a majority of employees and also refused to petition
for an election. Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB,
95 S. Ct. 429 (1974).
The use of authorization cards as a means of obtaining exclu-
sive representative status has been a source of much litigation
I An authorization card is a signed statement by an employee designating a
particular union to represent him as his sole bargaining agent under the National
Labor Relations Act. An example of an authorization card may be found in NLRB
v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917, 918 (6th Cir. 1965).
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
3 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) authorizes employer petitions whenever the
employer is presented with a demand for recognition.
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 159(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
3 If an employer's unfair labor practices tend to make a fair election
improbable, the Board will order him to bargain with the union. Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This
case is the consolidation of two cases, Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), and Wilder Mfg. Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
416 U.S. 955 (1974).
See Gorden, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to Bargain, 19 LAB.
L.J. 201 (1968); Rains, Authorization Cards as an Indefensible Basis for Board
Directed Union Representation Status; Fact and Fancy, 18 LAB. L.J. 227 (1967);
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Under the Wagner Act,"° an employer could petition for an election
only when two or more unions each claimed to represent the same
employees."1 Thus, when a single union demanded recognition
based on authorization cards, the employer would either have to
recognize the union or refuse recognition and risk being found
guilty of the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain." In Franks
Brothers Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the Board
could order the employer to bargain with the union it had wrong-
fully refused to recognize, even though that union had subse-
quently lost its majority status. 3
Section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Taft-Hartley Act expanded the right
of employers to petition for an election by allowing employer peti-
tions even when only one union demanded recognition.1 The
Board's test for allowing an employer to refuse a demand for recog-
nition and petition for an election, however, was that the employer
must have a "good faith doubt" of the union's majority status. 5
The petition could not be used to gain time to dissipate the union's
majority, 8 and employer unfair labor practices tending to do so
would be evidence of a lack of a good faith doubt. If the Board in
its investigation and hearing found that a good faith doubt of the
majority status existed, it would then conduct an election.,' The
burden of proving a good faith doubt remained on the employer
until 1965, when the Board held that its own General Counsel had
Wells, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. Rv.
349 (1969).
11 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-88 (1970).
" 95 S. Ct. at 433, citing S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11; 93 CoNG.
REc. 3838 (1947).
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). See note 4 supra for the text of this section.
13 321 U.S. 702, 704-05 (1944).
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
Is See In re Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949). The Board's
order was reviewed and partially modified in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d
732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
185 F.2d at 741.
,7 See, e.g., Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1966).
, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970) provides, in part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed ... the Board shall inves-
tigate such petition and ... provide for an appropriate hearing upon due
notice. ... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and certify the results thereof.
[Vol. 77
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the burden of proving employer bad faith before it would issue a
bargaining order.19
The good faith test continued in effect until 1969, when the
Board announced in oral argument in NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co.
that it was abandoning it.21 While Gissel held that an employer
who committed unfair labor practices likely to dissipate a union's
majority status could not insist upon an election before it must
bargain with the union,2 the important aspect of the case was the
Board's decision not to issue a bargaining order solely on the basis
that the employer refused either to recognize a union that pos-
sessed authorization cards purporting to establish the union's ma-
jority or to petition the Board for an election.Y Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision in Linden gives judicial sanction to procedural
policy that the Board adopted in Gissel.
The issue in Linden of whether an employer who refuses recog-
nition must petition the Board for an election centered around the
interpretation of three provisions of the Act.? Two of these sec-
tions24 clearly impose a duty on the employer to bargain with the
representative chosen by a majority of employees in an appropriate
unit.? However, neither section prescribes the manner in which
this representative must be chosen. 2 The employer is free to recog-
nize the union on the basis of authorization cards,27 but the pre-
" John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99, 100 (1965).
395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
21 Id. at 600.
2 Id. at 594.
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a), 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
Section 158(a)(5) provides that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a)."
Section 159(a) provides, in part, "Representatives . . .selected . . . by the
majority of the employees in a unit. . . shall be the exclusive representatives of
all employees in such unit . .. ."
Section 159(c)(1)(B) provides, in part, "Whenever a petition shall have been
filed. . . by an employer, alleging that one or more. . . labor organizations have
presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section
a; the Board shall . . . direct an election .... "
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970).
21 95 S. Ct. at 434 n.1.
2 Id. at 434-35.
2 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596. However, an employer
may not recognize a minority union. Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
731 (1961). If this happens, the Board requires that the employer withold recogni-
tion until an election can be held. Id. at 739.
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ferred method is a Board-conducted election.28 Justice Stewart,
joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell, dissented and
agreed with the conclusion of the court of appeals"- that Con-
gress, by enacting the section that authorizes employer petitions,"0
was placing the burden on the employer to petition for an election
if he chose not to recognize the demand based on authorization
cards.31 Justice Douglas, writing for the majoritys concluded, how-
ever, that this section was enacted only for the purpose of eliminat-
ing the discrimination against employers that occurred under the
Board's prior rules permitting an employer to petition for an elec-
tion only when two or more unions each claimed to represent the
same employees and that this section was not intended to place a
burden on either party. 2 Justice Douglas observed that the Board
has more expertise in this area and that it was the Board's judg-
ment that employer petitions should not be required.3 For these
reasons, the Court held that the Board's decision to place the
burden on unions to invoke the election process when an employer
refused recognition was not an abuse of discretion."
Perhaps the most important effect of the burden-shifting as-
pect of Linden will be to aid in reducing the time involved in
determining employee representation. For example, an important
issue in deciding the representation question is the determination
of the appropriate unit to be represented." Employer petitions
often request a unit larger than the one the union wants so that
the union will not have the majority backing it would have in the
smaller unit. If these two units differ significantly, the Board will
dismiss the employer's petition, placing the burden on the union
to file its own petition.2 With the decision in Linden, a union,
knowing that the employer is not required to file a petition, will
' 95 S. Ct. at 431.
= Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
31 95 S. Ct. at 435 (dissenting opinion).
'" 95 S. Ct. at 433. Justice Douglas cites the debate on the bill, where Senator
Taft, one of the sponsors of the bill, stated that the purpose of this section is simply
to allow an employer to petition. No reference was made to making an employer
petition mandatory. 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947).
' 95 S. Ct. at 434.
u Id.
= Id. at 433.
See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 794 (1970); Bowman Bldg.
Prods. Div., 170 N.L.R.B. 312 (1968); Amperex Electronic Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 353
(1954); Win. Wood Bakery, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 122 (1951).
[Vol. 77
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file its own petition and thus shorten the process. 7 Also, a union
that petitions for an election, rather than filing unfair labor prac-
tice charges will expedite this recognitional process. As the Court
pointed out, the Board's ruling in Linden took approximately four
and one-half years, and the ruling in Wilder Manufacturing Co."5
took approximately six and one-half years, while the average time
for processing an election petition is only forty-five days. 9
Linden, then, leaves an employer with four alternatives when
presented with a demand for recognition based on authorization
cards.4" First, he may simply recognize the union. 1 Second, he may
petition for a Board-conducted election." Third, he may agree to
be bound by the results of an expedited consent election." Finally,
he can refuse to recognize the union or to petition for an election
and, as in Linden, transfer the burden of invoking the Board's
election process to the union."
William G. Mercer
" 95 S. Ct. at 433-34.
- 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972). This case was consolidated with Linden before the
court of appeals. See note 7 supra.
' 95 S. Ct. at 432.
40 Id. at 435-36.
" See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
,2 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
See 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 (1974) which provides, in part, that when a petition
has been duly filed, the employer and the labor organization may enter into an
agreement providing for a waiver of hearing and a consent election.
" 95 S. Ct. at 434.
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